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Five workers are called in by the general manager: two men, three 
women. The only obvious things they have in common is that they are so-
called Coloureds in a factory where the majority of workers are African. 
Also they are all known members of a trade union, the Food and Canning 
Workers Union (FCWU). 
The timing is significant. After initially being willing to meet with the 
union, the company is refusing to have anything more to do with it. The 
union in turn has just applied for the appointment of a conciliation board, 
in an attempt to utilise the official system to compel the company to 
negotiate wages with it. 
The general manager tells the workers they are dismissed. There is no 
form of enquiry, and no reasons are given. What should the workers do? 
What should the union advise? 
2 VICTIMISATION DISMISSAL 
To lose your job for no good reason is one thing. But it is the reason itself 
that characterises dismissals as victimisation. 
This was generally not stated at the time of the events alluded to above. 
It did not have to be. It was enough for workers to suspect the motive for 
the dismissals was their involvement in the union. 
In a country with minimal social security, dismissal will always be the 
workers' greatest fear. Especially so when their jobs are considered un-
skilled. Yet this fear is also a spur to organisation. Organisation holds out 
the potential to constrain the employer's power. 
The power to dismiss is what constitutes the employer's power over the 
workers employed by him.' Victimisation, it follows. concerns far more 
than the right of individual workers not to be treated unfairly. It is what I 
would describe as an act of power. 
The object is to prevent a particular kind of organisation; organisation 
that represents an alternative locus of power in the workplace. This is 
I 1 refer to "the employer" as male because employers generally were in the period 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
what a union signifies to capital; especially when the union is in the pro-
cess of being established. and capital has not yet devised strategies to 
contain it. 
It can achieve this object in two ways, Firstly and most obviously it en-
gineers a particular outcome: removing from the workplace persons who 
constitute a threat, in this case. Secondly and more importantly it operates 
at a symbolic level, by sending out a message to the workers at large. or 
anyone with the idea of organisation as a countervailing power. 
If the five had been victimised, as the workers believed, they had a 
remedy in law. Victimisation was illegal in terms of the 1937 amendments 
to both the Labour Relations Act (as it is now known) and the Wage Act. 2 
Moreover victimisation was one of the few offences in which the legisla-
ture had shifted the onus to the accused. 3 
In so doing the legislature had not merely indicated that victimisation 
was to be viewed in an extremely serious light. Faced with the inherent 
difficulty of proving a reason which is even less likely to be stated once 
regarded as evidence of criminal intent, a presumption in favour of organ-
ised workers was needed for any such prohibition to be effective. 
To this extent a right of organisation was established, in terms of what I 
characterise as "black letter" law.' It was the only statutory right of this 
kind until the introduction of the 1995 Act,5 Surely then the proper course 
must be to seek legal advice. or institute legal proceedings? 
Nothing barred the union from doing so at the time. in the case study 
on which my argument is based, For an unregistered union the remedy 
was to institute criminal proceedings, There was also a basis to interdict 
the employer in the High Court, insofar as a clear statutory right was 
violated. 6 
2 S 66 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937 and s 25 of Act 44 of 1937 (the Wage 
Act), I shall refer to the Industrial Conciliation Act or Labour Relations Act simply as 
"the Act", 
3 S 18 of what is now the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. but was preceded by the 
Factories Act 22 of 1941, with a corresponding provision in s 22 of the Shops and Of-
fices Act 75 of 1964, See also s 66 of the LRA 28 of 1956 and s 25 of the Wage Act 5 of 
1957, 
4 "The 'black letter' tradition continues to overshadow the way we teach, write and think 
about law, Stated baldly it assumes that although law may appear irrational, chaotic 
and particularistic, if one digs deep enough and knows what one is looking for, then it 
will soon become evident that the law is an internally coherent and unified body of 
rules, The claim that law is unified and coherent is also sustained by a battery of dual-
isms: common law/statute law. law/policies, law/state, law/morality, , . which make it 
more tenable to regard law as 'pure' and 'scientific'," (Sugarman 1991.) 
5 See Ch 3 of Act 66 of 1995. Certainly, I would argue. no comparable rule can be said to 
have been as clearly and unambiguously established in all the "unfair labour practice" 
jurisprudence of the Industrial Court. Compare for example the Industrial court'S am-
bivalence on a "right" to bargain or the "right" of a union to be consulted regarding re-
trenchments, 
6 See Thompson and Benjamin (1995: 1017), In the Bosman Transport case, workers 
were seeking an interdict against victimisation, See PE Bosman Transport Workers 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW; VICTIMISATION AND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
But the FCWU was a registered union. The official system for the reso-
lution of disputes was open to it. This entitled it to choose an alternative 
forum. It could apply for the establishment of a Conciliation Board (there 
being no Industrial Council). Failing resolution there it could demand the 
dispute be referred to arbitration. 1 In this instance arbitration would have 
been by the industrial tribunal. 
Of course a close calculation of the union's chances was called for, be-
fore taking such a course. The starting point of such a calculation would be 
an analysis of the facts. 
The Fanis and Monis strike of 1979 was one of the most publicised la-
bour disputes of the period. s From the facts made public, people drew the 
obvious inferences. In the court of public opinion the employers were 
guilty of victimisation. 
But what were the prospects of the courts drawing the same inferences, 
or determining a case in the union's favour, in April 1979? 
3 THE NATURE OF THE ELECTION 
This is not to engage in idle speculation. The workers and their union were 
confronted with a concrete historical choice. They could look to the courts 
(or the industrial tribunal) for relief. This is what I characterise as trusting 
in the "legal option". Or they could trust in their own organisation, and 
resort to self-help. 
A constellation of organisations forming what became known as the 
emergent union movement faced a more or tess similar choice. Most of 
them were unregistered, and many not strictly speaking unions: this 
merely restricted the scope of the option open to them. 
But the choice that confronted the workers, the reader may suppose, 
was not of an "either ... or" nature. Resort to legal strategies does not 
necessarily foreclose other options. Legal and organisational strategies. it 
is commonly assumed, can be readily combined. 
Were that always possible, it would indeed be the best of all possible 
worlds. Yet the case of Fattis and Monis illustrates the fallacy of the as-
sumption. 
On hearing of the dismissal of the five, the workers decided to do what 
the union always advised in such an eventuality. That was to stand to-
gether. It was not a strike, as the workers saw it. They simply wanted to 
know the reasons for the dismissal of the five. 
In so doing workers articulated as best they could both the nature of the 
nght at issue, and the reasons for their action. Their faint hope was that 
7 S 66( I) and (2) of the Act. Were the employers to reject this demand. the union could 
apply to the Minister to have the dispute referred to arbitration. There were after all 
"reasonable grounds" to believe workers had been victimised. A refusal by the Minister 
was surely a matter for review by the High Court. 
8 The writer was General Secretary of FCWU from 1976 until 1986 and of FAWU from 
1986 until 1988. Records on the union and the Fanis and Monis strike are in the FCWU 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
the general manager would relent: perhaps pretending it had all been a 
misunderstanding to save face. 
This the general manager would not do. Having resorted to an act of 
power, he could not now back off without severely diminishing his power. 
Instead he invoked constituted authority in his support. Inspectors of the 
Department of Labour were summoned. 
The inspectors tried to separate the Coloureds from the Africans. The 
workers would not allow this. The upshot of the dismissal of five was the 
dismissal of them alL On the bosses' version. they "dismissed them-
selves". 
Now consider what alternatives had been open to the workers. Their 
collective sense of outrage at the injustice perpetrated enabled the work-
ers to make a united, stand. That sense could only dissipate with each 
passing day they failed to respond. A legal strike was not even a theoreti-
cal possibility." Even if it had been. it would not have been a practical 
proposition because of the time it would take to implement. 
It would take even longer to bring the matter to a conclusion. following 
the "legal option". But this does not explain the "once-off" nature of the 
election made. That is a consequence of what the "legal option" necessar-
ily entails: removing the power of the parties to determine the issues for 
themselves, and entrusting that power to a court or ostenSibly neutral 
third party. 
For the referral of a dispute. whether to a court or other forum, entails 
submission to an authority whom the parties acknowledge has the right to 
bind them. or to a legal regime whose legitimacy is accepted. By the same 
token. opting for self-help entails an element of disregard. even disdain. of 
constituted authority. 
That is why for the workers the die was now cast. It would be politically 
impossible for them afterwards to reverse course. and reinstitute the 
"legal option". For even if workers could be said to have acted in igno-
rance of their "rights", the same could not as easily be said of the union. 
The union would have to sponsor any legal action taken, 
4 THE CONTEXT OF THIS ENQUIRY: THE JUDICIALISATION OF 
LABOUR RELATIONS 
In the same week that the Fattis and Monis workers went on strike the 
Wiehahn Report was tabled in parliament. One of its recommendations 
was to establish an industrial court. 
However. the attention of the emergent unions was focused on what 
seemed more immediate challenges, It was hard to know what to make of 
the proposed court even though one union commented "what is abSOlutely 
q Not only were legal strikes practically unknown at the time. but the majority of the 
workforce were African, African workers were not yet permitted to belong to a regiS-










































TR.ADE UNIONS AND THE LAW: VICTIM1SATION AND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
clear is that the court is going to possess enormous 'law making' power" 
(Maree (ed) 1987: 179).'° 
Few would dispute that the court did indeed assume such law-making 
power, even though it was to be some years before it did so with confi-
dence. As a consequence what some have called the "new" labour law has 
been elaborated, in an extraordinarily short space of time. 
In the "black letter" tradition a court's role is merely to interpret and 
apply the rules. It was entirely without precedent for a court to assume 
law-making powers. " Even more so in that the industrial court was not a 
court of law strictly speaking, but a quasi-judicial tribunal. How then is the 
court's assumption of such Wide-ranging powers explained? 
Some have described this development as juridification. If this is an apt 
characterisation, there was nothing inevitable about the way it came 
about. The short time it took can be said to be due to the rapid growth of 
unions and the escalating conflict which the Fattis and Monis strike 
epitomised. Juridification, then, represents a state strategy to neutralise 
conflict through legal regulation. '2 
But this does not explain the particular trajectory the juridification of 
labour relations has taken in South Africa. The court started out with no 
clearly defined relation to the legal system, and no clear legal mission. 
What it became was increaSingly modeled on the superior courts. In 1988 
it was formally brought under the sway of the superior courts, and the 
judiciary. 13 
This describes a process of judicialisation. But it was not just the struc-
tural subordination of the court that was established in this process. It was 
the ascendance of a discourse premised on a belief that "the law" applied 
to labour relations: "the law" being rules which only the judiciary could 
authoritatively enunciate. 
5 POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
How did it happen that the judiciary were entrusted with the power to 
determine labour disputes? Why did unions accept that "the law" ex-
tended to labour relations? How could this "new" law be regarded as legi-
timate? 
10 This is the only published commenr by a union about the proposal of the court I am 
aware of, and one of the very few in the period of its existence. 
11 As late as 1987 in the case of Trident Steel (Pty; Ltd v)ohn NO (! 987) 8 IL) 27 a legal 
challenge was mounted to the court's assumption of the power to make determina-
tions, See especially 29-32, 
12 See Clark (1985: 69), Simitis' definition of juridification is essentially apolitical: "the use 
of the law (labour law, social security law, commercial law, family law, etc) by the state 
to 'steer' social and economic life in a particular direction ." But for Otto Kirch-
heimer, who coined the term in the Germany of the 1920s, juridification was a means 
of neutralising political conflicts. 
13 Act 83 of 1988 introduced the labour appeal court, presided over by a supreme court 
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The legitimacy of law is at issue where there is a clearly delineated 
struggle between contending forces, and a question of power is to be deter-
mined. This is more usually so with labour law than other branches of law. 
The "new" labour law that evolved in the US, according to Klare (1990: 
66), is animated by liberal political assumptio.ns and values. The paradox 
for him is the extent to which labour has internalised these values and 
assumptions. His object is to explain law's "hegemonic function" in le-
gitimating and reinforcing workplace hierarchy. 
Klare's case in point is a decision of US Supreme Court concerning self-
help: in this instance, in response to an employer's breach of a recognition 
agreement." It set a crUCial, anti-labour precedent. His concern is the com-
plicity of unions and their lawyers in the process by which it was arrived 
at. 
For it was framed in a discourse unions and their lawyers had articu-
lated, and based on "precedents from cases brought to and won in the 
Supreme Court by unions, not by employers, cases which significantly 
enlarged unions' rights" (his emphasis). 
To what extent are Klare's concerns about the "new" labour law in the 
US equally applicable in this country? There were significant unions which 
expressed serious reservations at the extent to which unions in the I 980s 
relied on the "legal option". However, except in the earliest phases of 
organising the emergent unions these reservations were rarely articulated, 
and not put in writing. 
Such were the "gains" achieved by unions in the court (it is generally 
supposed) that these reservations were eventually dispelled. In such 
histories as there are, resort by unions to the "legal option" is portrayed as 
largely unproblematic. There are references to "telling gains" and "land-
mark victories" Which unions have won through the courts. There is the 
even more extravagant suggestion that the court became a weapon in the 
hands of the unions. IS 
This is not to say there were not criticisms of the court. However, the 
concern of unions and their lawyers seemed to be that the court was not 
enough of a "real" court of law. 16 Their criticisms concerned the quality 
and consistency of its judgments, and the appropriateness of some rules, 
rather than whether it was appropriate to vest the court with rule-making 
powers at all.17 
14 Boys Market Inc v Retail Clerks Local 770 398 US 398 (1970). 
15 See Friedman (199129); Baskin (1991: 29); Thompson (1988). 
16 A leading trade unionist once described the court's presiding officers as "failed advo· 
cates". I have heard the same said by trade union lawyers. from whom the trade un· 
ionist in question doubtless picked it up. By implication, if only there were "successful" 
advocates appointed to preside (in the same manner as high court judges are) their 
problems with the court would be overcome. 
17 On the part of employers, the court was criticised for being too well-disposed toward 
labouL Interestingly, the same was said of early litigation in terms of the Wagner Act in 
the US. On the part of labour. there was criticism that the court was too much influ-
enced by the common law notion of the employment contract. See. ego Davis (1985: 
425). The first fundamental criticism of the court was from a deregulationist. free-










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW: VICTIMISATJON AND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
The industrial tribunal had been a forum with no rule-making power at 
all. Even so, the necessity for a court of law is undisputed in such histories 
as there are. Some form of court was seen as an "historical inevitability", 
according to one leading text on labour law. IS As another would have it, 
the need for a "judicial guardian" was the logical outcome of the system 
introduced by the 1924 Act l9 
Why then did it take more than 70 years to introduce a "judicial guard-
ian", if indeed the official system required one? Why was the model the 
industrial tribunal represented abandoned? There is no adequate explana-
tion. If the establishment of the court represented a decisive shift, the 
reasons must be explained. 
What these histories have in common is their quest for a legal rationale, 
which will explain (and justify) the extension of the domain of "the law"; 
and establish a continuity which is indispensable to the idea of "the law" 
as ascertainable rules. Yet it is only possible to do so by regarding law as a 
discrete discipline, and disregarding social and political reality. 
It is this apolitical and ahistorical approach I take issue with. My object 
in doing so is not to dispute the necessity for a forum where disputes can 
be referred for determination. It is the nature of that forum, and the 
conditions under which organised workers can hope for labour justice, 
that are the object of this enquiry. 
My object is also not to dispute "gains" in the development of labour 
law. It was an obvious and necessary condition of judicialisation that 
"gains" of some kind would be made in the courts20 Yet it is in relation to 
key issues and struggles that the nature and limits of these gains, and the 
scope of the "legal option", become apparent. 
Victimisation is such an issue because it concerns questions of power. 
There can be no effective workers' organisation without effective protec-
tion from victimisation. Without effective organisation of workers, the 
edifice on which the "new" labour law is constructed has no foundation. 
Hence my case in point, the Fartis and Monis strike. 
Yet it was more than a case of victimisation, it was a struggle which 
assumed symbolic dimensions. The only outcome that could have mat-
tered to the union was reinstatement. Reinstatement in any form would 
tilt the balance in the union's favour in the organisation not only of that 
factory, as it turned out, but an entire industrial sector. 
18 This was supposedly because the common-law notion of an employment contract no 
longer had a "commercial rationale" (Brassey et a/ 1987: 9). The suggestion that unions 
sought "the imposition of solutions from above". made by Brassey er ai, is certainly not 
true of the tradition FCWU was pan of. 
19 The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 was the first Labour Relations Act. See Cameron 
etal (1989: (5). 
20 Accordingly it is beside the point to draw up a balance sheet of "gains" and "defeats" 
in the court. "Gains" and "defeats" can in any event only be assessed, in my opinion, 
on the basis of the insider'S detailed knowledge of the facts. Any narrative is selective, 











































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
It would have indeed "enlarged" union rights were any court to order 
such an outcome. But was it ever a realistic possibility? In addressing this 
question I hope to make good a silence on the part of a tradition I sub-
scribe to. It is a tradition which emphasises the primacy of organisation. 
Foucault talks of "subjugated knowledges". One such subjugated knowl-
edge is that it is through organisation and self-help, rather than resort to 
courts, that rights of organisation are established. 
Against this subjugated knowledge I put the notion of courts having 
"enlarged" union rights. It is of course a truism that courts enlarge rights, 
if by "right" one merely means what the courts regard as such. But more 
than this, the notion of "enlarging" rights suggests that it is primarily through 
legal means, as distinct from organisation, that rights are extended. 
6 ENLARGING UNION RIGHTS? THE JUDICIARY AND THE 1937 
AMENDMENTS 
To illustrate the extent to which courts have "enlarged" union rights, 
consider the reported cases of victimisation. 
A line of high court and Appellate Division cases "interpreted" the 1937 
amendments to the Act which made victimisation an offence. All were 
appeals by accused employers. convicted in the magistrates' courts. All 
were upheld. often on technicalities. 
It might be said this only goes to show the difficulty in proving the sub-
jective state of mind of the accused employer.22 Yet the grounds giving rise 
to an allegation of victimisation are objective. What the statute required 
was for the courts to draw the appropriate inference. 
The superior courts were unwilling to do so, manifestly. Instead they 
reached out to protect the accused. 2; Yet they were to prove less than will-
ing to reach out to other accused in other statutory crimes where the onus 
was similarly reversed."' The obvious explanation for this is that in victim i-
sation cases the accused is an employer, drawn from their own class." 
21 See R v Gutner 1934 TPD 278. The technicality here was that the employer was not an 
employer as defined in terms of the Industrial Council Agreement in terms of which he 
was charged. Though the judge could have referred the matter back to the Attorney-
General to determine whether there had been an offence in terms of the Wage Act, he 
did not: "that course does not seem necessary to me". See also R v Bolon 1941 AD 
345; R v Sachs ! 940 SA~I 412; R v Wilson 1948 1 SA 1 170 (T); R v Bassa 1944 NPD 
239; R v Watson 1948 I SA 51 1 (T) 
22 Cf Thompson (1988: 340) "Victimisation. . is notoriously difficult to establish." 
23 Bolon's case explicitly affirms this. Tindall. J in Ex parte Minister oj justice: in re R v 
Bolon 1941 AD 345: "The construction pressed upon us by the attorney general might 
often result in an erroneous condemnation of an accused employer ... I am not pre-
pared to hold that the legislature. . used that expression in a sense which might tend 
to such a result." 
24 Notably the offences created by the Terrorism Act 83 of 1967. 
25 "judicial officers are not unideological disinterested robots or computers ... most are 
former advocates and for that reason part of the economically most prosperous level of 
the population. All these sectors make it advantageous for judges to help sustain (albeit 
subconsciously) a status quo which privileges the minority group to which they belong." 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE l..AW; VICTIMtSATION AND SEL.F-HEL.P REMEDIES 
The fact that magistrates were overruled in all the reported cases 
probably reflects the different class composition of the magistracy, and a 
greater willingness on their part to uphold the social objects of the legisla-
tion. Bassa's case'· conveys some sense of this. It is remarkable not only 
for the intemperate terms in which the judge criticises the magistrate, but 
that he considered the employer's attitude to trade unions of such little 
consequence in a case of victimisation: 
.. he [the magistrate] has taken an entirely wrong view of the case. He ap-
pears to think that iF an employer expresses or holds the view that he is op-
posed to trade unions, then when he dismisses an employee the reason for the 
dismissal is because he suspects or believes that the employee belongs to a 
trade union. ,,27 
What, then, is one to make of the fact that the one case which the court 
was prepared to draw the kind of inference the statute called for was not 
reported
28 
Certainly the judge was not lacking eminence (Solomon AJP). 
Could it be the reason that Sarkin's case was not reported was that it was 
differently decided? 
Sarkin's case illustrates the danger of basing one's analysis of "the law" 
on reported judgments. "The law" is after all not discovered, as the "black 
letter" tradition would have it. It is produced. Editors of the law reports 
and commentators, as much as the judiciary, are part of the machine 
doing so. 
7 THE ALTERNATIVE WHICH THE 1956 ACT CREATED 
In practice, "the law" on victimisation established by the superior courts 
was thus as follows: although an offence on paper, it was not one courts 
would enforce. Not even if the workers were white.'· 
This stance of the courts did not merely reflect an unwillingness to in-
tervene in a struggle between organised workers and their employer. In 
each case it was to determine an outcome to such struggles. 
26 R v Bassa 1944 NPD 239. 
27 Hathorn, JP in R v Bassa 1944 NPD 239 240. The judgment is an essay in class preju-
dice. Some gems: "When he [the victimised worker] had finished his work for the ap-
pellants at about 10.30 am he did eight hours' work for another employer. I would 
have thought that in itself was a reason for dismissing him instantly. Then he some-
times shaved in the bakery. a most disgusting thing to do. And he sometimes slept in 
the van." 
28 R v Sarkin TPD 1944. cited in R v Wilson 1948 1 SA 1170 tn, where the following 
passage from the Judgment of Solomon AJP is quoted: " ... it seems to me that the 
section is so worded that if the illegal motive intrudes itself at all into the mind of the 
accused employer and influences him in any way to dismiss employees. . he brings 
himself within the ambit of this section." There is no other reported judgment where a 
similar approach is adopted 
29 In about 1977 I was told by the regional head of the department of labour that there 
had never been a successful prosecution of an employer for victimisation. As an ex-
ample of the unwillingness of the courts to convict an employer of victimisation, see eg 
R v Wilson J 948 I SA I 170 (1). Even where victimisation is shown, it is not sufficient 
unless it is shown to have been the effective cause of dismissal rather than one of a 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Thus in Watson's case the victimised worker was part of the "reform 
groLlf seeking to oust the corrupt leadership of the Mine Workers Un-
ion.' The "reform group" in turn was part of the drive of Afrikaner na-
tionalism to secure a base in the union movement." 
Afrikaner nationalism gave rise to one of the two important labour 
struggles which were to determine the character of the union movement 
until the late 1970s. The other was the struggle of mainly unskilled, mainly 
African workers to organise themselves into unions, and the tradition of 
non-racial unionism it gave rise to. PCWU was formed in this latter tradi-
tion.32 
"The law" on victimisation had not changed by t 979. But the party the 
white workers helped vote to power had in the meantime created an 
alternative. The 1956 Act created a new body to arbitrate disputes, the 
industrial tribunal. 
The tribunal was not a court of law. It did not adopt a judicial mode, or 
attempt to articulate a body of legal principles in determining disputes. It 
also did not distinguish between so-called "disputes of right" and "inter-
est" when doing so. 
It comprised a chair and two other persons appointed "by reason of 
their knowledge of the interests" of employers and employees resp,ec-
tively.'; Its decisions were majority decisions of the panel of three. • In 
effect it was a tripartite body. It was its tripartite character which enabled 
it to deal with organised labour justly. from the point of view of the estab-
lished unions of the time. 
Yet this was an established union movement representing primarily 
white. skilled workers. The Object of the t 956 Act was to consolidate their 
position in the workplace hierarchy. At the same time it was to eradicate 
the vestiges of non-racial unionism, represented by the tradition PCWU 
was part of. 
Non-racial unionism was not simply at odds with the apartheid agenda, 
It signified a tradition of unionism that was an alternative locus of power 
in the workplace, It would be the historic mission of the emergent unions 
of the 1970s to establish (or re-establish) this tradition," 
This was the underlying political reality which in the final analysis de-
termined that any case brought in any court on behalf of the Panis and 
30 See 0 Meara (1983: 78). and R v Watson 1948 1 SA 51 I (T). 
31 See also O'Meara (1983: 89), 
32 FCWU was founded in 1941 and registered in terms of the 1937 Act. Soon afterwards 
it affiliated to the Trades and Labour Council. That body split over the "racial" issue 
into two components in the early 19505, one of which became the Trade Union Council 
of SA (TUCSA). The other, to which FCWU affiliated. was the SA Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU). 
33 S 17(1) of Act 28 of 1956. There were in fact two panels of employer and employee 
representatives: one for local authorities and one for all other employers and employ-
ees. 
34 S 17 (8) (b) of Act 28 of 1956. Arbitrations could take place in terms of ss 45. 46 and 
49, 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW: VICTIMISATION AND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
Monis workers would certainly have been lost. To understand why re-
quires an explication of the political assumptions underlying the dispute, 
without which any analysis of Fattis and Monis actions would be perfunc-
tory, 
8 THE POLITICS OF VICTIMISATION 
Coloured workers were selected for dismissal, on the underlying assump-
tion that Coloureds will not strike in support of each other. A safe as-
sumption, given the debilitated state of Coloured working class organ-
isation in Cape Town.'6 
The same assumption did not apply to the Africans workers. who were 
considered more militant. This explains why Africans were not dismissed. 
even though they (unlike the Coloureds) were technically members of an 
unregistered union. 
Because of the cultural divide between Africans and Coloureds, fostered 
by apartheid. it was further assumed Africans would not come out in 
support of Coloureds. To do so would be unprecedented. Being in the 
main migrants. they also had far more to lose.'7 
When an employer dismisses, there is an assumption of entitlement in 
his exercise of power. Underpinning thiS, in the case of Fattis and Monis, 
was that it both relied upon and was giving effect to what were then 
central tenets of government policy: to divide African and Coloureds, and 
prevent effective organisation of industrial workers emerging. 
Organisation amongst the Coloured workers was bound to collapse as a 
consequence of the dismissals. Assuming the union could do nothing to 
protect the Coloured workers, organisation amongst the African workers 
would be impossible to sustain. 
Yet it is only when the dispute is understood in the context of FCWU's 
contest with the established union movement that the object of the em-
ployers strategy becomes apparent. Fattis and Monis had long recognised 
another union in respect of a small section of the factory.'· It was affiliated 
to the leading federation in what was then the established union move-
ment. This was their foil to the charge of victimisation. 
9 THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION 
Courts in this analysis, whether courts of law or tribunals, are not neutral 
arbiters in a contest between equals. They constitute a regime in which 
some are more equal than others. 
36 This is as a consequence both of being an underclass in relation to the coloured middle 
class and relatively privileged in relation to the African working class. 
37 Almost all (he African workers were "migrants" and resided in company hostels, For 
migrants. the inevitable consequence of striking was not merely dismissal. but being 
bussed back to the homelands, 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
One has only to appreciate the nature of the regime the industrial tribu-
nal constituted to appreciate why a referral to the Tribunal in the case of 
Fattis and Monis could never have been contemplated. 
The fundamental assumption underlying resort to any kind of court is 
that it will be impartial. The tribunal could not be impartial: but this was 
not because of the mere fact that there were representatives of the estab-
lished union movement on it. Its whole function was bound up with 
maintaining the collaborative relationship between employers and the 
established union movement of the time, premised on white privilege.,q 
Would a court of law have been impartial? I would argue that through 
the tripartite composition of a tribunal the question of bias is at least 
openly addressed. T~ believe a court of law would determine a just out-
come would require it to transcend its role as an organ of state, in uphold-
ing constituted authority. 
Yet all indications were that the Fattis and Monis dismissals were not 
the aberrant act of an isolated employer. They were the considered re-
sponse to a perceived threat to employers as a class: a response, moreo-
ver, entirely consistent with state policy at the time. The inherent problem 
with referring such a dispute to court is thus its political nature. 
There is a further problem particular to a case of self-help. It should go 
without saying that workers do not resort to self-help without a reason, 
but the value judgment a court of law would have to make is whether they 
were justified in doing so. It is a value judgment a court of law is peculiarly 
ill-equipped to make, for a number of reasons. Fundamental amongst 
them is the fiction which the "black letter" tradition operates to maintain, 
that it is the prerogative of the courts to establish rights. Self-help repre-
sents a challenge to this prerogative. In essence it is about enforcing 
"rights" by means of power. 
9 ADVOCATING THE "LEGAL OPTION" 
It is well known that the emergent unions were established against the 
opposition, the established union movement of the time. 
Less often remembered is the keenness of the contest among the emer-
gent unions that marked its establishment 40 It was a contest for member-
ship. It was also a contest for dominance between the different traditions 
of organisation each represented. 
In a free market of organisations, the unions that would prosper would 
be those best able to survive on their own resources. But capital was not 
to be a passive onlooker. Victimisation was a strategy whereby it could 
intervene, in favour of whichever tradition was to its liking. It was also a 
strategy that could backfire, as Fatris and Monis found out. For above all 
39 Concerning its Function in determining job reservation disputes, see Coetzee (1976: 46 
87 135) 
40 I regard the period of the establishment of the emergent union movement as being 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW: VICTIMISATION AND SELF·HELP REMEDIES 
else, workers would support a union which effectively countered victimi-
sation. 
It was in the quest for effective redress against victimisation that offi-
cials and advisers to certain emergent unions first began to advocate the 
"legal option". But it was a strategy which they could never have contem-
plated without donors to put up the money for them to do so:' 
The attractions of the "legal option" were obvious. Organisation was 
embryonic. Unions were up against hostile employers. Mass dismissal was 
regarded as the inevitable consequence of a resort to self-help. 
But these were reasons of weakness. They were not the kind of reasons 
a union could admit to its members, or with which to win the confidence 
of the unorganised; particularly at a time when different unions were 
contending for ascendancy. 
To justify legal strategies there had at least to be some prospect of suc-
cess: some belief that through the courts unions could perhaps more easily 
win as much, if not more, than through a course of struggle. 42 Even if 
there was no realistic basis for such a belief, a notion of courts "enlarging" 
union rights had to be propounded. 
This is not to say it was not a sincerely held belief. Nonetheless it was a 
self-serving one on the part of legal professionals who had a material 
interest in advocating the "legal option". 
The emergent unions they advised were mainly unregistered. Conse-
quently their recourse in cases of victimisation had to be to the ordinary 
courts." Anything less than reinstatement would mean the employers had 
to an extent succeeded. 
But to achieve reinstatement through the ordinary courts it was first 
necessary to persuade the high court this was possible. The decision oj 
Schierhout v The Minister oj Justice44 was regarded as authority for the 
proposition that "the law" did not permit an order of specific performance 
in the case of an employment contract. So an argument was constructed 
With the object of persuading the judiciary it was. Several of those in-
volved in articulating it would SUbsequently be prominent in the develOp-
ment of the "new" labour law. Indeed the judicialisation of labour 
relations can be traced back to their efforts to do so. 
This necessitated disregarding the unambiguous message the courts had 
sent out on the 1937 amendments. Instead they based their argument on 
a t 953 case, regarding the eviction of a white worker from a company 
42 Principally through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions substantial 
sums of money were made available to certain unions for, amongst other things. "legal 
assistance" . 
42 The adversities faced by the unions that adopted legal strategies were typically over· 
stated. "You can't organise in a Nazi concentration camp", one lawyer is quoted as 
saying. See Friedmann (1991: 317). 
43 If the state refused to prosecute, as frequently happened, this entailed instituting a 
private prosecution. 










































LAW, DEMOCMCY &. DEVELOPMENT 
housing, This was authority for the proposition that dismissals in contra-
vention of statute were null and void, Assuming victimisation could be 
proved, it went, the remedy in law must be reinstatement:5 
In the event. it failed to achieve its object. The Transvaal high court re-
fused to reinstate the victimised member of an emergent union in 1975:· 
It was wrongly decided, these advocates of the legal option insisted. So 
further cases were fought and losr. 47 To the extent that they can be said to 
have eventually succeeded with this line of argument, it was in persuading 
the Transvaal high court on appeal not to uphold an in limine point that 
reinstatement was not possible. That w,as in 1982, in the Stag Packing's 
case.
4B 
For me there is no irony that this "triumph" came at the stage it did"· It 
is confirmation of the thesis I wish to advance. For some two years earlier 
a "right" to reinstatement had been won through organisation, as the 
outcome of the Fanis and Monis strike will illustrate, This was a significant 
period of time, in what was a formative period for the emergent unions. 50 
Perhaps the courts could be said to have consolidated a "right" won 
through organisation. But this is a much more modest proposition than 
the advocates of the "legal option" were advancing: that through the 
courts unions could enlarge or win rights, The former implies that without 
organisation such rights would not be recognised. The latter implies that 
"the law" and the courts could themselves be vehicles of change. 
10 WIEHAHN AND THE COURT 
The notion of courts as vehicles of change must be located in the era of 
political reform which the appointment of the Wiehahn Commission 
heralded.51 [[ was consonant with a political project of persuading people 
to seek change through legal. rather than extra legal means." 
Could a court of law be a vehicle of change for organised workers or the 
working class? The Commission's proposal to establish an industrial court 
45 This was on the basis, following Rooiberg Minerals Development Co (Pty) Ltd v Du TaU 
1953 2 SA 505 (T), that a dismissal in contravention of the Act was null and void. and 
hence the contract of employment was resuscitated (Cheadle 1980: I), 
46 Kubheka v Imexrra (Pty) Ltd 19754 SA 484 (W) 
47 See, eg, Mabaso v Net's Melkery (Pty) Ltd 1979 4 SA 358 (W); Makhanya v Bailey NO 
(1980) I ILJ 219 tn, See also Cheadle (1980) and Benjamin (1982: 22-34), 
48 The case of NUTW v Stag Packings (pry) Ltd 1982 4 SA 151 tn, 
49 "It is ironic". according to Thompson and Benjamin (1995), that this "triumph" came at 
a time when the trade unions were beginning to focus their attention on the industrial 
court. 
50 Many or most of the unions which were to achieve significant power in COSATU grew 
significantly in the period 1979 to 1981. Eg. MAWU (now NUMSA), NUTW (now 
SACTWU) CCAWUSA (now SACCAWU) GWU (now T&GWU) and FCWU. This growth 
coincided with a brief economic upturn, Amidst fanfare from the government about 
reform, the variOUS relations between the unions, capital and state had begun to crys-
tallise, 
51 The Centre for Applied Legal Studies was established in 1978, the Legal Resources 
Centre in 1979, 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW: VICTIMISATIONAND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
pertinently raised the question. But it was never squarely addressed by the 
unions. A related question exercised the emergent unions instead, in what 
has been characterised as "registration debate". This was whether to 
register in terms of the 1979 Act. Registration represented the gateway to 
the official system. Yet implicit in their position on the official system was 
a standpoint on the "legal option". 
It was understandable that some should elevate not registering to an 
issue of principle, given the political climate at the time. Clearly it was not. 
Yet it also suited the proponents of registration to characterise the debate 
in these terms. 
The proponents of registration argued that by operating within the offi-
cial system unions could "win" rights. But it was never clear how partici-
pation at that specific juncture would enable them to do SO.53 For it was 
always the terms on which registration was proposed that was at issue. 
The political problem unions were confronted with was as follows: how 
to reconcile a non-racial tradition of organisation with the registration of 
racially separate unions for "blacks" only. For the African workers at Fattis 
and Monis this would be to cement the very division, opposing which the 
workers had placed their jobs on the line for. 
The "solution" some advocated was to promote the uncritical accep-
tance of the "legal option" by workers and unions. Thus unions were to 
apply for non-racial registration. When this was refused (as it inevitably 
would be) unions would challenge their registration as racially exclusive 
unions in the courts. 
This not only suggested a capacity (or inclination) on the part of the 
courts to disregard the unambiguous terms of the Act and take the unions' 
part. It was to look for legal solution to what was a political problem. At 
the same time it underestimated the unions' strength outside the system. 
Of all the arguments against registering one was decisive. At the junc-
ture at which the state opened the option of registration, it needed to 
draw unions into the official system. For that very reason, the capacity of 
the emergent unions to change the system was greatest: provided they 
stayed out and voiced credible reasons for doing so. Without credible 
participants the system itself was not credible. 5' 
By exactly the same logic, the capacity of the emergent unions to influ-
ence the character of any court, or "win" rights, would lie in its need for 
them to submit to its authority, to establish its legitimacy. 
11 WINNING A RIGHT TO REINSTATEMENT 
Some seven months after they went out, the Fattis and Monis workers 
were re-employed, amongst them the five who had been victimised in the 
53 According to Fine and others "the winning of rights from the State has been a vital part 
of all labour movements". Their article evoked indignant responses (correctly so, in my 
view) because of its characterisation of those opposed to registration as "boycotters". 
(Fine. De Clercq & Innes 1981. and Hirsch & Nicol 1982.) 
54 One might describe this as collective bargaining by non-participation, as distinct from 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &, DEVELOPMENT 
first place. They were not paid for the time they had been out. They did 
not necessarily return to the same positions in the factory. Yet workers 
had won far more than mere re-employment and the economic benefits a 
job implies. 
In terms of the settlement agreement negotiated, Fattis and Monis un-
dertook to formally recognise the union. Other "rights" were also won. 
The employer's power to dismiss workers without a final warning was 
expressly constrainedss 
However, the recognition agreement Fattis and Monis put forward was 
designed to constrain the union. Its centerpiece was a "disputes proce-
dure" coupled with a clause which generally goes under the euphemistic 
title "labour peace" obligation. This entailed the determination of "dis-
putes of right" by arbitration, and a renunciation of the right to strike over 
them. 
Fattis and Monis was in no position to impose terms at the time. Yet 
this was the first of many negotiations with a variety of employers, in 
which disagreements turned on the same issues. Employers would put 
forward their draft as the basis of negotiation. It would feature a distinc-
tion between "disputes of right" and "interest". "Disputes of right" would 
usually be innocuously presented as synonymous with dismissal dis-
putesSb Employers would then argue for the determination of all "disputes 
or right" by arbitration, or the court. 
Workers could not be expected to forfeit resort to self-help, the union 
would respond. Victimisation concerned a right which in the last resort 
workers were bound to enforce themselves. Refusing to renounce self-
help was not a recipe for lawlessness. It was the workers' best safeguard 
against violations of their right. 
Rather than a bad agreement, the union preferred no agreement. For 
the point of an agreement was to create an alternative to the official 
system. Employers were susceptible to an alternative. Some accepted that 
unions had legitimate reasons for staying out of the system." Some hoped 
unions could be persuaded (or bluffed) in the negotiation process to forfeit 
any right to self-help they still retained. In all cases employers wanted 
union participation in some system. 
Probably the most important agreement the union negotiated was at 
the next factory organised in the same sector as Fattis and Monis. After 
protracted negotiations with the Premier group, an agreement was 
55 For a period of one year. a copy of such warning was to be sent to the union. Two 
exceptions were permitted. for what workers regarded as objectively verifiable of· 
fences: drunkenness and assault. 
56 I do not suggest that this is how "disputes of right" should be defined. The essence of 
such a definition ought to be a right that is claimed by a party. whether by virtue of 
statute. contract or collective agreement. which is the pOSition in France (Blanc-Jouvan 
1971: 9). 
57 They were open to persuasion primarily because the unions that articulated this 










































TRADE UNiONS AND THE LAW: VICTIMISATION AND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
concluded. 58 By 1982 practically the same agreement had been extended 
to branches in all the national centres. 
The following clause in a "labour peace obligation" 'sets out the basis on 
which the union was prepared to forfeit resort to self-help: 
"If a strike, sit down, work-stoppage, gO-SlOW or lock-out takes place before or 
while the procedures embodied in this agreement are being utilised, the com-
pany and the union shall make every endeavour to ensure that normal working 
conditions are restored. Should a dispute have arisen from the dismissal of an 
emp/oyee(s), such emp/oyee(s) shall be reinstated until the dispute settlement pro-
cedure has been exhausted.""" 
In short, as a condition for the adherence to agreed procedures for the 
resolution of disputes, including disputes regarding dismissals, a right to 
reinstatement was established. It goes without saying that the dispute 
settlement procedure did not include compulsory arbitration. 
Reinstatement, in the context of the negotiations which gave rise to this 
agreement, meant reinstatement in the workplace. Anything less than 
actual reinstatement would place the workers and union at a disadvantage 
in any procedures that ensued. For in any determination of a question of 
power. the tendency is to confirm the status quo. 
12 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT 
Law is usually taken to be statute law or what the courts pronounce. Yet 
the agreement above established a rule emanating from organisation, at a 
time when no such rule had previously eXisted. 60 It was in the context of 
the development of "law" such as this that the establishment of the court 
must be located. 
The court the Wiehahn Commission wanted was a court of law!' It 
would be premised on a distinction between "disputes of right" and 
"disputes of interest", and operate on the basis of judicial precedent. It 
would thereby create "a mechanism whereby the strike weapon could be 
replaced by a judicial inquiry into the dispute" (Wiehahn Commission 
Report 1979: 42-46). 
As to why the tripartite model the tribunal represented could no longer 
work, the Commission was silent. This may seem surprising given the 
tribunal's importance to the established union movement of the time and 
their representation on the Commission. 
58 The group was represented by the MD of its most important operating division. Com-
panies were frequently represented by very senior persons at negotiations during this 
period, both because of the perceived importance of labour relations and the perceived 
incompetence of management to deal with it. 
59 Recognition agreement between SA Milling Co and FCWU and AFCWU, clause 52. 
1981 
60 Cf Arthurs (1985: 83). Legal pluralism advances a notion of law as emanating from a 
variety of sources. and permeating all aspects of social and economic life. 
61 A court of law was distinguished from what it characterised as the "labour-manage-










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
The explanation for this silence is not unrelated to the Commission's 
preference for a court of law. There was no inherent problem with a 
tripartite tribunal: the problem was rather how organised workers were to 
be represented on such a tribunal once trade union rights were extended 
to African workers. In short, it was a political problem. 
A court of law represented a solution so long as it was accepted as le-
gitimate. To this end section 43 of the Act was amended in September 
1982. The industrial court (as opposed to the minister) was empowered to 
grant status quo relief. 62 In cases of dismissal the court could now order 
temporary reinstatement, although it seldom meant being physically rein-
stated in one's job'"} 
The status quo remedy has been described as one suited to unions, pri-
marily because it is unions that would want the status quo restored. Yet it 
was a remedy decided on the papers. This placed a premium on skillful 
drafting, and legal argument. It necessitated dependence on lawyers, and 
promoted the characterisation of labour disputes in terms of a legal dis-
course. 
The 1982 amendments signified an important shift in state policy. The 
overriding objective of the Wiehahn Commission had been to prevent the 
growth of a dualistic system. To achieve this it was hoped unions would 
register or be obliterated. When the Act was amended in 1981 to allow 
non-racial registration for the First time, the position of those who had 
opposed registration was vindicated.M Yet other amendments to the Act in 
1981 provided unregistered unions with fresh reasons to stay outside the 
system. 
By 1982 it was clear that these unions would neither register or be 
obliterated. On the contrary, they were growing, and becoming increas-
ingly politicised. At the same time, at the interface between the emergent 
union movement and manufacturing capital, an alternative system was 
evolving alongside the offiCial system. This alternative system promised to 
enlarge union rights in significant ways. The undertaking in the Premier 
agreement to physically reinstate dismissed workers illustrates this. 
The only compelling reason for a policy shift was to arrest this devel-
opment. HenceForth it would be pOlicy to invite their participation through 
the dispute resolution procedures of the official system and the medium of 
the court.°
b 
But if the court was to enlist credible participants, concessions 
would have to be made to labour. The remedies the court could offer had 
62 Act 51 of 1982 came into operation on I September 1982. See Thompson (1988: 339). 
63 S 43(7) 
64 It is suggested by Bendix (1989: 306) that the 1981 amendments were also a result of 
litigation by unions challenging the industrial Registrar'S refusal to register them on a 
non-racial basis. However. if this had been the extent of the opposition. it is scarcely 
plausible that the state would have found it necessary to change tack. 
65 Act 57 of 1981 allowed for the registration of non-racial unions but at the same time 
introduced a number of controls aimed at unregistered unions. 
66 Unregistered unions were now able to apply for conciliation boards and refer disputes 
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at least to be on a par with what could be achieved in the alternative 
system. 
Compared with other jurisdictions, reinstatement as the remedy for 
dismissal is perhaps the most significant "right" the court has estab-
lished."7 But well before it was "won" through the court, it had been won 
through organisation and consolidated in agreements. It was the capacity 
of emergent unions to compel reinstatement in South Africa that explains 
the court's preparedness to do so. To achieve credibility in the circum-
stances. the court could hardly offer less. 
13 THE SCOPE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
Despite aspirations to evolve an alternative system, the capacity of unions 
to do so was always limited. To the extent that it was a system that 
evolved, it did so in an unco-ordinated manner, and was not inFormed by 
any common perspective on the part of the emergent unions. 
It scarcely could have been otherwise, given unresolved differences be-
tween emergent unions on the "legal option" and like matters. And so 
long as the contest between emergent unions persisted, the private 
agreements each negotiated remained private!" 
The implications of the distinction between "disputes of right" and 
"disputes of interest" illustrates the dimensions of the problem confront-
ing emergent unions in recognition negotiations. Far more was at issue 
than a mere scheme for the convenient resolution of dismissal disputes. 
Underpinning the distinction was capital's desire to preserve a separa-
tion of the political and the economic spheres. The notion that industrial 
action was legitimate only in relation to economic issues flowed from that 
separation. So too it legitimated judicial regulation of labour relations. 
Ultimately it insulated capital against challenges to its authority."" 
It was difficult enough to appreciate these implications. It was quite an-
other to articulate alternatives in negotiations with employers. Wittingly or 
unwittingly, emergent unions unhesitatingly adopted compulsory arbitra-
tion for so-called "disputes of right". 
Moreover. the underlying problem with any system premised on private 
agreements is one of enforcement. If it was unwise to renounce resort to 
self-help, it was equally impractical to have to rely on it to enforce agree-
ments. This problem could conceivably have been addressed if there had 
been some co-ordinated strategy on the part of unions to do so. In its 
absence. recourse to some form of authority became inevitable. 
67 In the US, eg, the accepted remedy for unfair dismissal is compensation. The Appellate 
Division significantly watered down the application of this remedy in the case of Pact v 
PPWAWU (1994) ILJ 15 (A) 65. 
68 This was in marked contrast to the employers who often used the same consultants. 
attended the same seminars. and swopped agreements. 
69 It seems to me that at the core of liberal legal theory is a conceptualisation of power as 
merely economic power. which disavows the fundamental political and economic ine-










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
14 A "LANDMARK" CASE OF VICTIMISATION 
The "landmark victories" and "telling gains" alluded to must be situated in 
the light of the failure of emergent unions to articulate an alternative and 
in the light of the imperative of the court to achieve legitimacy. How then 
should such claims be evaluated? 
The 1983 case of United African Motor &. Allied Workers Union v Fodens 
(SA)1O is one such victory. It concerned the archetypal rogue employer. 
Victimisation was one of a shopping list of allegations against him. The 
court ordered him not to victimise his employees (again). Also the dictum 
that it could be unfair not to furnish an undertaking not to victimise was 
established. 
Certainly this decision had a symbolic importance. The message was to 
call employers to order. Yet the extent of the "gain" for labour should not 
be overstated. At the start of the proceedings. the employer had in effect 
thrown in the toweL 7 ' So too had the union. For even though it had asked 
for the reinstatement in its papers. its own representative submitted 
reinstatement would not be appropriate. 
This is not the only indication that the tradition of unionism UAMA WU 
represented was anathema to what other emergent unions stood for. Its 
witnesses were from the industrial council. the department of labour and 
the employers' association. It is hard to resist the assumption that they 
were coming to the rescue of a compliant union that was contending with 
less compliant unions for membershipn 
If the role of the court was to be extended, it was necessary to declare 
itself against victimisation. In Fodens' case it was able to do so without 
disturbing the balance of power in any way. 
These were the first crucial years of the court's "active existence" as 
well as the period of the establishment of the emergent union movement. 
Yet apart from this case. victimisation hardly features in the reported 
cases. This is certainly not because victimisation ceased to occur. 73 
Even more so than in Fodens' case. the message from the court where 
rights of organisation were at issue was hardly ever as unambiguous as 
some commentators would have us believe. 7• Optimistic readings of 
judgments were possible. because there was a consensus amongst a new 
layer of managers and professionals about the role of the court in labour 
relations. This new layer included. alongside labour lawyers. the hitherto 
70 (1983) 4 IL] 212 (lC). 
71 The employer handed in an undertaking amongst other things not 10 victimise work-
ers. and to negotiate with the union. Thereafter it did not participate in the proceed-
ings. 
72 Foden's was engaged in the manufacture of trucks. The union was thus in competition 
with NAAWU and MAWU, and was never a Significant player in the industry. 
73 See Thompson & Benjamin (t 995: 1020C). where it is suggested that the incidence of 
viC[imisation is not so great as to warrant such an "array of legal sanctions". The fact 
that there were no recorded prosecutions for victimisation for the period 1980·1983 is 
cited in support of this. However strikes arising out of dismissals were highly prevalent 
throughout this period and subsequently. 
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unknown personae of the industrial relations manager, mediators and 
arbitrators. 
15 "LAW" IN AN ERA OF REPRESSION 
Victimisation also hardly features in the reported case from about 1985 
until 1990, the period in which what had been the emergent union 
movement was established. 75 
It might be argued that this was because of the "unfair labour practice" 
remedy itself. It was not necessary for the court to find victimisation to 
find there had been an unfair labour practice, or to order reinstatement.'6 
A 1986 case illustrates the argument. Amongst a group of workers who 
stayed away from work during a period of so-called unrest, only the 
shopsteward was dismissed." He was probably selected because he was a 
shop-steward, the court said. Whatever the motive, it was not a proper 
78 one. 
Yet what are we to say of the coyness of the court in giving the em-
ployer's conduct its appropriate label? It is too easily ascribed to the 
difficulty of attributing a motive to him. 
Insolence and insubordination are what I characterise as offences 
against authority. Motive defines them, only the motive of the subordinate 
worker in the eye of the employer. This has not prevented the court from 
elaborating a concept of what these offences entail.'9 
There was only one reported case concerning a victimisation dismissal 
in this period.'o It was decided on the papers. The union alleged victimisa-
tion. The company denied it. The presiding officer was not able to decide 
the matter on the papers. But because the union ought to have anticipated 
that he would not be able to do so, he awarded costs against them." 
75 The 1990 "accord" between COSATU, NACTU and the employer federation SACCO LA 
marked its definitive establishment. 
76 See, eg, NUM v Unisel Gold Mines Ltd (1986) 7 ILl 398, where victimisation is suggested 
but not in so many words, and the worker is reinstated. 
77 See Black Allied Shops Offices & Distributive Trade Workers Union v Homegas (Pty) Ltd 
(1986) 7 ILl411 417. 
78 In Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v NUM (1986) 7 ILl 108 (W) the argument (amongst 
others) raised in the high court was that dismissal for participation in a lawful strike 
could constitute victimisation. It was rejected on the facts of the case. In NAA WU v At-
lantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1989) 10 ILl 948 (lC) the issue was an inducement by the 
employer to resign from the union, which did not constitute victimisation in the strict 
sense. 
79 See, eg, Ngubo v Hermes Laundry Works CC (1989) ILl 591 and Tubecon (Pty) Ltd and 
NUMSA (1991) 12 ILl 437 (ARB). 
80 National Union of Food Workers v Champ Food Manufacturing Group (1989) 9 ILl 469 
(lC). In Mazibuko v Mooi River Textiles Ltd (1989) 10 ILl 875 (lC) the issue related to in-
ter-union rivalry, and a bid by the majority union to enforce what amounted to a closed 
shop, by having members of the other union dismissed. This, the court found, was tan-
tamount to victimisation. However, it was victimisation at the instance of the majority 
union, where the employer had clean hands. 
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The award of costs against a union sends out a particularly strong mes-
sage, Did it relate to the bringing of an application on the papers, as the 
judgment states? Or was it also an expression of disapproval, at victimisa-
tion being alleged?" 
On the facts disclosed in the judgment, one can only speculate, What is 
clearly absent in this judgment is the sort of enquiry an experience of 
union organisation or a perspective on working class reality calls out for. 83 
So too, from a working class perspective, the nature of the "unfair la-
bour practice" remedy cannot be a sufficient explanation as to why the 
court failed to develop a jurisprudence of victimisation, For that would be 
to give a "legal" reason primacy, instead of the organisation and politics of 
the time, 
In the workplace, strategies of repression were increasingly giving way 
to strategies of incorporation as the emergent unions consolidated their 
position there 84 OutSide, the country was in the grip of recession, Wide-
spread retrenchments were the order of the day, To eradicate an un-
wanted union presence retrenchment was the obvious course,ss 
Retrenchment became the focus of much of the court's jurisprudence, 
But recourse to the court was by now well established, The opinion of 
unions and their lawyers no longer mattered so much, Increasingly the 
court devised rules which were patently intended to enhance capital's 
power over labour: a notable example being its invention of the so-called 
"no difference" principle, 
CWIU v Sopelog"6 illustrates the application of the "no diFFerence" prin-
ciple, Two union members were selected to be retrenched, ostenSibly on 
"merit", But there were reasons to believe it was really because of their 
union profile, Victimisation was alleged in the pleadings, but no weight 
was given to this in the judgment, or to the subjective nature of a "merit" 
assessment, Consultation had clearly not been adequate, but because 
82 In an unreported interlocutory judgment I was told about by an official of the Food and 
General Workers Union. costs were awarded against the union when it applied to 
amend its statement of case in s 46(9) proceedings to include an allegation of victimi· 
sation, 
83 The employer's reason for dismissal was a threat he alleged the shopsteward made: to 
necklace a worker who did not pay his subscriptions, SuFfiCient reason to dismiss (one 
would have thought) without any additional justification, Curiously, the employer adds 
two additional reasons, More curiously, these reasons patently could not constitute 
valid grounds for dismissal (both related to warnings for unrelated offences, at least 
one of which was some two years previously), The presiding officer fails to comment 
on this and other peculiarities about the employer's version, 
84 Of the political alliance that ultimately became the mass democratic movement. the 
trade unions alone were able to continue functioning throughout the state of emer-
gency, 
85 Unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector were particularly hard hit by retrench-
ments They had been the organisational base of the emergent unions in the period of 
their formation, As a consequence the class composition of the workforce was chang-
ing, This in turn was to facilitate strategies of incorporation on the part of employers 
(Hindson & Crankshaw 1990: 23), 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW: VICTIMISATION AND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
consultation would have made "no difference" to their selection, the re-
trenchments were not unfair. 
A roil-back of earlier union "gains" had always been on the cards once 
recourse to the court was established. But the economic crisis was also a 
political crisis. In devising this kind of partisan jurisprudence the court was 
acting in concert with the repressive state. It was also inspired to do so by 
the 1988 amendments to the Act. 
16 CODIFICATION VERSUS JUDICIALISATION 
The focus of the unions' campaign against the 1988 amendments was 
against the provisions that inhibited strike action and facilitated the award 
of strike damages against unions, and the codification of the unfair labour 
practice definition. 
The object of the codification was to restrict the unlimited scope for in-
terpretation of the old definition. But it did so by seeking to qualify and 
limit the potential unions had to make "gains" in the court. One commen-
tator described it as "an attempt to claw back control and reverse the new 
body of case-built law" (Thompson & Benjamin 1995: para AI-3~) 
Yet the more enduring amendment was to be the introduction of a right 
of appeal to a labour appeal court, presided over by a judge, with a further 
appeal to the appeal court. This was to set the seal on the judicialisation of 
labour relations at a time when the judiciary were more involved than they 
ever had been in shoring up the authority of employers in the workplace."7 
The paradox is that this did not feature at all in the campaigns against 
the amendments. In fact, some of the sharpest criticisms of the industrial 
court from "union lawyers" would be over its failure to· respect the 
authority of the labour appeal court.
S8 
This was one of the issues the labour appeal court confronted in the 
CWlU v Sopelog appeal. It found the retrenchments were unfair and re-
jected the "no difference" principle
so 
The more even-handed approach 
this epitomised goes some way to explain why judicialisation was not, it 
seems, an issue in the accord that gave rise to the 1991 Act either.90 
87 It was symptomatic of the economic and political crisis that labour disputes increas-
ingly gave rise to occupations. sleep-ins and the like. See O'Regan (1988: 959) for an 
example of the constrained tones in which the judiciary is criticised that characterises 
much academic legal writing. 
88 See, eg, the Employment Law editorial vol 9 no 5 May 1993: "Mohamedy's Meets the 
Mountain" regarding the court's ruling concerning the issue of consultation prior to re-
trenchment. 
89 The LAC hearing was shortly after the COUrt's judgment in TATU v Spoornet (1993) 2 
LCD 323 (lC)' in which the industrial court declined to follow the judgment of the LAC 
in NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pry) Ltd (1993) 14 IL} 642 (LAC), in more or less 
open defiance of the higher court. The case provides an illuminating example of judi-
cial discourse. TATU v Spoornet is not explicitly criticised. Instead the judge analyses 
the reversal of one of his own decisions on appeal, thereby suggesting that a court 
ought to abide by the higher court'S decisions. 
90 Act 9 of 1991 reflecting the accord between government, capital and labour that is 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY 6. DEVELOPMENT 
Yet underlying this more even-handed approach was. I suggest. a well-
founded fear that the court's partisan image was eroding its legitimacy. 
How much had the unions' achieved through this body of case-built law? 
Would unions not be better served by a codification restricting the scope 
for judicial intervention, especially now they were able to influence its 
content? 
The "gain" of the National Union of Mineworkers in the Marievale Con-
solidated Mines case rectified an anomaly.·' For until this decision the 
court drew no distinction in principle between workers dismissed on a 
lawful strike and workers who had resorted to self-help unlawfully. 
Yet where workers resorted to self-help lawfully. in the case of MacSteel 
v NUMSA. 92 it was found to be unfair. And where workers attempted to 
take lawful strike action over" the dismissal of their fellow workers it was 
held that in doing so in preference to "quasi-judicial remedies" they had 
forfeited the protection of the court." 
The thrust of the cases, I would argue. has been to restrict the organisa-
tional capacity of unions. The fact this is not more often acknowledged 
above all reflects the absence of a critical legal tradition. This absence is 
explained by the fact that labour'S lawyers are themselves part of the 
machine producing the "new" law. It is therefore not surprising that it 
should have been a union labour lawyer who first legitimated the unlawful 
resort to self-help by an employer." 
So too, the extent to which the cases have established union rights has 
been limited. The "right to bargain" Fodens' case conferred was one most 
emergent unions had won through organisation. The outcome was calcu-
lated to preserve the weak in the marketplace of organisations. It did not 
assist MA WU that there was such a right, when it asked the court to com-
pel plant level bargaining
q5 
It also did not extend to assisting a union seek-
ing to compel an employer to negotiate a recognition agreement with it:" 
Over the first years of the court's active existence until 1986 FCWU 
grew no more slowly than any other emergent unions. At the stage when 
MAWU was seeking to compel plant level bargaining, it had already 
achieved centralised bargaining in the milling and baking sector. whose 
organisation the Farris and Monis strike had generated. Yet it did not find 
it necessary to resort to the court to secure its gains. There was no right of 
organisation it did not enjoy for failing to do so. 
In 1986 the union merged with other unions that had a different ap-
proach to the courts and law; and in 1988. if the commentators are to be 
believed, it won a "landmark victory" in the courts. 
91 NUM v Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd (1986) 7 ILl 123 (lC). 
92 I I ILl 995 (LAC). 
93 Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Bevalold (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILl 447. 
94 Gubb <5< fngs Ltd v SACTWU (1991) 12 ILl 41 5 (ARB). 
95 MA WU v Hart (1985) 6 fLl 478 (lC) 
96 This "right" was only recently affirmed in the case of FGWU v Design Contract Cleaners 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW; VICTIMlSAT/ON AND SELF·HELP REMEDIES 
The case of FA WU v Spekenam Supreme"7 concerned the mass dismissal 
of workers who resorted to self-help in response to the refusal of their 
employer to settle a recognition agreement. The message sent out was 
greeted with applause by the labour law fraternity for its unequivocal 
rejection of voluntarism and its affirmation that" ... in general terms it is 
unfair for an employer not to negotiate bona fide with the representative 
union ... " 
The outcome of the case was the mass dismissal of over 600 workers 
and the union's worst organisational defeat to date. It is a reminder to 
lawyers to beware of their own propaganda. 
17 WIEHAHN MARK 2 
In 1993 the minister of manpower (as he then was) asked Professor 
Wiehahn to conduct an investigation: a commission was not the appropri-
ate form for a political regime in transition to adopt. Its aim was to inves-
tigate amongst other things the "esteem in which the court is held and the 
respect for the court or lack thereof" and the "perceived bias" of its presid-
ing officers."S 
Implicit in this was that the court faced a crisis of legitimacy. In the 
event the nature of the crisis was never confronted. The investigation was 
curtailed by the process which resulted in the 1995 Act. 
An editorial in Employment Law acknowledged such a crisis in the fol-
lowing terms: 
"What will be required is more than just a change in complexion, though the 
symbolic value of replacing whites by blacks and males with females should 
not be underestimated. Judicial officers will have to be appointed who under-
stand and articulate working class concerns and aspirations ... To survive the 
court will have to become what it has never been: a forum in which labour 
carries as much weight as management. ,,"" 
But the implications of this last statement were not developed. For if the 
court had been biased in favour of management, as this statement sug-
gests, what is one to make of the law it has elaborated? Certainly the 
received wisdom that unions "enlarged" rights through the court would 
have to be re-evaluated. 
The object of this article has been to assert the primacy of organisation 
and the capacity of workers to resort to self-help in the process by which 
rights are established. R.ights recognised by the courts were often rights 
recognised in actual practice. Yet the form in which the court recognised 
such rights was often a truncated or distorted one. 
97 FA WU v Spekenam Supreme (1988) 9 ILJ 628. 
98 Circular letter dated 5 April 1993, from Prof N Wiehahn, Chairman of the Industrial 
Court Development Project. I received my copy through the Cape Town Attorneys' As· 
sociation. 
99 Editorial a propos Prof Landman's appointment "Landman Ahoy" Employment Law. July 
1993 vol 9 no 6. It adds: 'The public which the court serves is nor a general one. There 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
As to whether a court is capable of establishing rules which will accom-
modate the aspirations and concerns of the working class, no court will do 
so (it should go without saying) merely as a result of the character of the 
persons appointed to preside. It will need a discourse which acknowledges 
political realities to counter the discourse in terms of which labour law has 
thus far been elaborated. '00 
A court of law, operating within the constraints of the legal tradition, is 
not likely to elaborate such a discause. Why could a tripartite body not 
have been formed to determine disputes in the final instance? Alterna-
tively, why did unions not agitate for a bipartite body?,01 
18 THE ALTERNATIVE THE 1995 ACT HAS CREATED 
Some have interpreted the 1995 Act as curtailing the process of judicial i-
sation. To the extent that it does, it is through the establishment of the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and the 
codification of certain rights notably the right of an unfairly dismissed 
worker to be reinstated. 
It remains to be seen to what extent the CCMA will be able to shake off 
the constraints of the jurisprudence the court evolved. Yet its capacity to 
do so is restricted by its narrow jurisdiction. On fundamental issues, it is 
the new labour court which has the final (if not exclusive) say. 
Workers are, for example, permitted to strike in defence of the limited 
organisational rights described in sections 12 to 15 of the Act. But when 
they are dismissed for doing so, allegedly because of the employer's 
operational requirements, it is the labour court which will decide whether 
these dismissals were fair.1tl2 
On the other hand workers are not permitted to strike when their fellow 
workers are victimised. For the very reason that victimisation concerns 
the violation of the most fundamental right of organisation, it is regarded 
as the labour court's province to determine.'O} 
Take the latter day eqUivalent of what happened at Fattis & Monis in 
1979. The union could refer the case of victimised workers to the CCMA to 
conciliate. But failing a resolution throu~h conciliation, it would have to go 
to the labour court for a determination.' 4 
Ironically, the only way the union could have the dispute heard by the 
CCMA would be on the basis that the workers did not know the reason for 
100 According to Woodiwiss, cited in Du Toit (1994), "The law is a set of state-enunciated 
discourses which interpellates the subjects it addresses in such a way that they will be 
law-abiding, provided that the same subjects do not successfully resist this disciplining 
because of prior or other interpeliations produced by counter-discourses." 
1 01 Bipartite tribunals composed of employer and worker representatives determine 
disputes in France, a country with a tradition of political unionism. 
102 Ss 67(5) and 191(5)(b) 
103 The right concerned is described as the "right to freedom of association" in the Act. 
See ss 4 and 5. 
104 S 191 (5)(b)(i) I assume there would be little prospect the parties would agree to let the 










































TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW: VICTIMISATlON AND SELF-HELP REMEDIES 
their dismissal.'o, That was of course the case at Fattis and Monis in 1979. 
But it would not be sufficient, it seems, for workers merely to allege there 
was no reason. To be dismissed for no stated reason is not the form 
victimisation is likely to take in the 1990s. 
If then the workers were to resort to self-help over victimisation, it is the 
labour court which will decide whether it would be appropriate to order 
the union or the workers to pay compensation.,o6 Similarly, it is the court 
which will decide whether the workers were validly dismissed.,o7 
The labour court is composed of a president and deputy who are judges 
appointed by the judicial Services Commission. To this extent the judiciary 
still sets the parameters for the development of rights through the court. 
What is surprising in the context of the adoption of the 1995 Act, is that 
the question as to whether this is appropriate is not even being asked. 
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